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Regulatory forbearance and government financial support for the largest U.S. financial 
companies during the crisis of 2007–09 highlighted a “too big to fail” problem that has existed 
for decades. As in the past, effects on competition and moral hazard were seen as outweighed by 
the threat of failures that would undermine the financial system and the economy. As in the past, 
current legislative reforms promise to prevent a reoccurrence.  
  This paper proceeds on the view that a better understanding of why too-big-to-fail policies have 
persisted will provide a stronger basis for developing effective reforms. After a review of 
experience in the United States over the last 40 years, it considers a number of possible motives. 
The explicit rationale of regulatory authorities has been to stem a systemic threat to the financial 
system and the economy resulting from interconnections and contagion, and/or to assure the 
continuation of financial services in particular localities or regions. It has been contended, 
however, that such threats have been exaggerated, and that forbearance and bailouts have been 
motivated by the “career interests” of regulators. Finally, it has been suggested that existing large 
financial firms are preserved because they serve a public interest independent of the systemic 
threat of failure they pose—they constitute a “national resource.” 
  Each of these motives indicates a different type of reform necessary to contain too-big-to-
fail policies. They are not, however, mutually exclusive, and may all be operative simultaneously. 
Concerns about the stability of the financial system dominate current legislative proposals; these 
would strengthen supervision and regulation. Other kinds of reform, including limits on 
regulatory discretion, would be needed to contain “career interest” motivations. If, however, 
existing financial companies are viewed as serving a unique public purpose, then improved 
supervision and regulation would not effectively preclude bailouts should a large financial 
company be on the brink of failure. Nor would limits on discretion be binding.  
  To address this motivation, a structural solution is necessary. Breakups through 
divestiture, perhaps encompassing specific lines of activity, would distribute the “public interest” 
among a larger group of companies than the handful that currently hold a disproportionate and 
growing concentration of financial resources. The result would be that no one company, or even 
a few, would appear to be irreplaceable. Neither economies of scale nor scope appear to offset the advantages of size reduction for the largest financial companies. At a minimum, bank merger 
policy that has, over the last several decades, facilitated their growth should be reformed so as to 
contain their continued absolute and relative growth. An appendix to the paper provides a review 
of bank merger policy and proposals for revision.     
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JEL Classifications: G21; G28I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The free market system is fueled by the success and failure of firms in a multitude of industries. 
The exit of firms that fail as a result of market developments or managerial mistakes is as much a 
cornerstone of growth and efficiency as innovation and easy entry. When government intercedes 
to keep failed firms alive, it undermines the system’s foundations.  
  Banking, nevertheless, has long been treated differently. It has had the benefit of a safety 
net provided by the Federal Reserve and deposit insurance, supplemented by extensive 
supervision and regulation. For close to 40 years, however, “deregulation” has permitted banks 
to become more like other kinds of firms, with a broader set of permissible activities, the 
elimination of geographic restrictions, and relatively free entry. Exit for large banking 
companies, however, has remained a remnant of the past. Exceptional government support for 
stockholders and/or uninsured creditors of most banks was abandoned after passage of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991—but not for large banks 
deemed too big to fail (TBTF). 
  During the financial crisis of 2007–09, government intervention forestalled the failure of 
the largest financial firms in the country. The troubling implications of these bailouts have 
generated numerous proposals to prevent a reoccurrence. 
  This paper considers proposed reforms within the context of earlier experience and the 
possible motives for government support for large failing banks. Section II provides a brief 
review of the bailouts in the crisis of 2007–09 and their likely long-term effects. Section III 
provides background in the experience of the last 40 years. Section IV considers a number of 
suggested motives for these policies. Section V evaluates the implications of differing motives 
for the efficacy of different types of reform. An appendix provides information on the rapid 
growth of large banking companies through merger over the last two decades and proposals for 
revisions in merger policy.   
  There are significant obstacles to containing too-big-to-fail policies. Large banks and 
other financial firms, perceived as posing a systemic threat, typically become exposed to market 
instability over long periods of growth.
1 Even with improved supervision and regulation, 
                                                           
1See Minsky (1957, 1971). government support is likely. To paraphrase Hyman Minsky—“it can happen again.” But there is 
a better chance of dealing effectively with the problem if we have a better understanding of why 
it has been intractable. It is concluded that structural reforms to limit further increases (and, in 
fact, to reduce them) in concentration among the largest financial companies would be useful.   
   
II. TOO BIG TO FAIL IN FINANCIAL CRISIS   
 
Government support for the largest financial companies in the country during the crisis of 2007–
09 was multidimensional. In addition to traditional monetary ease, as well as an extension of and 
increase in deposit insurance, it included substantial Treasury investments in large banking 
companies, an unprecedented expansion of discount window credit, with the Federal Reserve 
(Fed) establishing an array of new programs to inject funds into specific financial markets, along 
with the purchase of the direct obligations of FNMA and FMAC, and financing mergers of large 
failed banks into other large banks. During the crisis, major investment and finance companies 
became bank holding companies to avail themselves of Federal Reserve credit.
2 The result of this 
extraordinary assistance was to sustain, with a few exceptions, the largest financial firms in the 
country.
3 The explicit intention was to avert a perceived threat to the financial system and the 
economy. Moral hazard and anticompetitive side effects were recognized, but discounted.
4  
 
III. AN INTRACTABLE PROBLEM     
 
Over the last four decades, legislative and regulatory modifications have failed to contain TBTF 
policies. Any number of pronouncements have been made, alternately expressing frustration as 
to bailouts of financial firms and confidence in reform. Following the collapse of Continental 
                                                           
2 These included Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and American Express, among others.   
3 The principal exceptions included the IndyMac F.S.B., an earlier spin-off from Countrywide Financial 
Corporation, that failed in July 2008, and Lehman Brothers, which went into bankruptcy in September 2008. Bear 
Stearns was acquired by J.P. Morgan-Chase with the help of financing by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; 
Wachovia was acquired by Wells Fargo; Merrill Lynch and Countrywide Financial were acquired by the Bank of 
America. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed in government conservatorship, but have continued to function. 
4 Market identification of financial companies TBTF makes possible low-cost funding that provides a competitive 
advantage, facilitates oligopolistic behavior, and encourages greater risk-taking. For a model of dynamic limit 
pricing with mutual forbearance in local banking markets that derives from the emergence of a small group of 
national/global banking companies with a presence in concentrated local/regional markets populated by a fringe 
group of smaller banks, see Shull and Hanweck (2001: 161 ff.)  Illinois, one of the largest banks in the country at the time, Congressman Fernand St. Germain 
expressed the frustration: 
 
“[Continental Illinois is] an institution that failed to survive without 
massive, record breaking, infusions of Federal moneys and credit. Deja 
vu. For a decade and a half [we]...have probed bank and regulatory 
failures....[W]e battled uphill ...to enact an entire set of new and 
improved supervisory powers—to make certain that no one in the 
Federal supervisory bureaucracy could claim they lacked the tools. Yet, 
today, we return to this forum... the granddaddy of bank failures... rolled 




In introducing a new restructuring of supervision and regulation in 1989, the Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA), after a decade of savings and 
loan insolvencies, the Secretary of the Treasury, Nicholas Brady expressed the confidence: “Two 
watch words guided us as we undertook to solve this problem—Never Again.”
6    
 
A. Experience since the 1970s 
The 1960s and 1970s were a transition period in banking, from a highly regulated system 
established in the 1930s to a relatively deregulated system. In the course of the transition, bank 
failures increased. The Fed, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and/or the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) typically supported failed or failing banks in one way or 
another.   
   “Open bank assistance” was provided by the FDIC on the determination that a bank was 
essential to its community.
7 Used sporadically until 1971, it extended such assistance more 
regularly thereafter.
8 The FDIC has indicated that it was aware that its assistance had harmful 
side effects. It asserted that it used its authority “...sparingly, because it was concerned that the 
                                                           
5 Fernand St. Germain, Inquiry into Continental Illinois Corp. and Continental Illinois National Bank (1984: 1). 
6 Brady (1989). 
7 Section 13(c) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950. For a detailed description of FDIC authority to support 
failed and failing banks, see FDIC (1998: vol. 1, part 1, ch. 2). 
8 In 1971, it provided “open bank assistance” to the floundering Unity Bank in Boston and, through the 1970s, to a 
number of other banks. Some of the better known were the Bank of the Commonwealth of Detroit (1972), the 
American Bank and Trust of Orangeburg, South Carolina (1974), Farmers Bank the State of Delaware (1976), and 
First Pennsylvania, the largest bank in Philadelphia at the time.   assistance would benefit stockholders, materially erode market discipline, and keep afloat a 
weakened bank to the possible detriment of the local community.”
9  
  The FDIC was not sparing in its support in cases where banks were not deemed 
“essential.” By arranging for a healthy bank to purchase the assets and assume all the liabilities 
of a failed bank, (a “P&A” transaction),
10 as opposed to simply paying-off insured depositors (a 
“payoff”), it was uncommon through the 1980s for uninsured depositors of any failed 
commercial bank to suffer losses.
11 The FDIC justified this approach as a way to “level the 
playing field” for smaller banks that had to compete with large banks that were TBTF.  
  The Federal Reserve provided assistance to failing banks as a lender of last resort. In 
1974, for example, it extended a substantial volume of credit to Franklin National Bank through 
its discount window that delayed its closing and afforded its uninsured creditors time to 
withdraw their funds.
12  
  The quintessential TBTF case, however, occurred in 1984 when Continental Illinois 
National Bank faced a run in the wake of rumors about bad loans. The FDIC, the Fed, and the 
OCC saw the pending collapse of Continental as a threat to a large number of smaller banks 
whose funds it held, as well as to other large banks whose uninsured creditors might quickly 
withdraw their funds if the Continental’s creditors experienced losses. The banking agencies 
coordinated support that included an assurance by the FDIC that all uninsured creditors of the 
Bank and its affiliates would be protected, and provided a large infusion of funds to augment 
Continental’s capital.
13 The Comptroller of the Currency testified, at the time, that the eleven 
largest banks in the Unites States were too big to fail.
14 
                                                           
9 FDIC (1998: vol. 1, part 2, p. 519).   
10 Because liabilities of the failed bank exceeded the value of its assets, the “P&A” transaction might require a 
payment by the FDIC to the acquiring bank. However, acquiring banks were frequently willing to include in their 
bids a premium for the “franchise” or “charter value” of the failed bank. 
11 Section 13(e) of the FDI Act allowed the FDIC to provide financial assistance to facilitate the absorption of a 
failing bank by another institution. However, it proceeded under the requirement that the cost incurred in the P&A 
transaction did not exceed the cost of a “payoff.” A “payoff” would leave the amounts returned to uninsured 
depositors subject to the liquidation process.  
12 For a discussion of the Franklin National case, other financial problems in the 1960s and 1970’s, and Federal 
Reserve policies, see Minsky (1982: ch. 2). For additional information on many of the major bank failures of this 
period, see Sprague (1986) and Hetzel (1991). 
13 See Isaac (1984: 457 ff.).  
14 He identified these as BankAmerica, Bankers Trust, Chase Manhattan, Chemical Bank, Citibank, Continental 
Illinois, First Chicago, J.P. Morgan, Manufacturers Hanover Trust, Security Pacific, and Wells Fargo.   In the late 1980s, the FDIC also extended guarantees to all uninsured depositors of the 
Bank of New England (BNE) suffering from losses on real estate loans and to two affiliated 
banks. The justification was that continued operation of these three banks was “essential” to 
provide adequate depository services in their respective communities.
15 BNE and its affiliates 
were ultimately taken over by the FDIC and sold to Fleet/Norstar Financial Group.
16 In this case, 
a Government Accounting Office report asserted that the OCC had repeatedly muted criticism of 
the bank and limited the scope of its examinations. The Comptroller acknowledged deficiencies 
in supervision and promised “to prevent similar problems from occurring again.”
17  
  About the same time, Citibank also experienced serious problems stemming from real 
estate loans and foreign debt. With major borrowers declaring bankruptcy, its debt was 
downgraded by the credit rating agencies. In July 1991, Representative John Dingell of Michigan 
announced that the bank was “technically insolvent.”
18 His assertion was disputed by William 
Seidman, then Chairman of the FDIC. Whether “insolvent” or not, Citibank’s actual capital level 
was inadequate. The OCC decision not to close the bank can be characterized as forbearance.   
 
B. FIRREA and FDICIA   
Concern about the insolvency of large numbers of savings and loan institutions (S&Ls), and 
commercial banks in the 1980s and early 1990s led to passage of FIRREA in 1989 and the FDIC 
Improvement Act (FDICIA) in 1991.
19 Among other things, these laws strengthened supervision 
and regulation with the aim of limiting forbearance and bailouts.    
  FIRREA mandated capital requirements for S&Ls no less stringent than those for 
national banks. It curtailed S&L activities deemed risky, and more so for what it labeled 
                                                           
15 The affiliates were the Connecticut Bank & Trust Company of Hartford, CT, and Maine National Bank of 
Portland, ME. 
16 The FDIC established bridge banks and ultimately reached a P&A agreement with Fleet for all three banks. See 
FDIC (1998: Vol. I, Part II, Ch. 8).  
17 Gerth (1991). 
18 The statement, which was made in “Hearing” before Subcommittee on Telecommunication and Finance of the 
House Energy and Commerce Committee, was widely reported. See Quint (1991).  
19 For a review of these problems and data on numbers of failures and assets of failed banks over the 1980s, see 
National Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement, June (1993); Randall (1989: 3–
24); and Barth, Brumbaugh, and Litan (1992: 29–54).      “troubled institutions.”
20 FDICIA elaborated the “troubled institution” approach of FIRREA, by 
establishing a new capital rating system requiring federal bank regulators to escalate their 
intervention as capital levels dropped (“prompt corrective action”).
21 
  FDIC assistance to uninsured creditors of failed banks through P&A transactions was 
terminated. FDICIA required the FDIC to resolve failed banks by the method least costly to the 
insurance fund, replacing the old standard that permitted a P&A transaction if it was less costly 
than a payoff.  Even if a P&A transaction that covered uninsured depositors was less costly than 
a “payoff,” it would always be more expensive than having the acquiring bank assume only 
insured deposits. The law also limited the FDIC’s ability to provide “open bank 
assistance” for “essential” institutions. These restrictions were coupled with constraints on 
Federal Reserve loans to undercapitalized institutions.
22 
  FDICIA, however, did provide an exception for banks whose failure posed a systemic 
threat. It provided that the FDIC’s “least cost” standard could be abandoned through a joint 
determination with the Federal Reserve and the Secretary of the Treasury (with agreement by the 
President) that compliance would have seriously adverse effects on economic conditions or 
financial stability (systemic risk exception). And “open bank assistance” could be authorized.
23 
  At best, FIRREA and FDICIA made a continuation of “too big to fail” policy uncertain.  
Their lack of success became clear in 1998 when the Federal Reserve prevented the immediate 
closure of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management out of concern for the solvency of 
large financial institutions to which it was indebted. It organized a group of creditors to 
recapitalize the firm. Fed Chairman, Alan Greenspan stated that the impact on moral hazard was 
                                                           
20 See Shull (1995: 585–612). Among other things, it prohibited “troubled institutions” from accepting brokered 
deposits, offering above-market interest rates on deposits, and increasing assets. Activities viewed as excessively 
risky, such as the holding of junk bonds, were prohibited. Equity investments were limited. 
21 A determination that a bank was not “well” or “adequately” capitalized was to trigger supervisory restrictions. 
Banks in the lower classifications were to submit an acceptable capital restoration plan. Banks in the lowest 
classification, “critically undercapitalized,” were to be promptly closed. The law specified a terminal requirement of 
tangible equity-to-total-assets of 2 percent for “critically undercapitalized” institutions. FDICIA also authorized the 
FDIC to establish deposit insurance premiums on a risk-adjusted basis and a new capital rating system that was 
applicable both to commercial banks and savings associations. Building, in part, on the Basle agreement on risk-
adjusted capital requirements (1988), it mandated that the agencies provide uniform rules for capital classifications 
that included “interest rate risk,” “concentration risk,” and “non-traditional activity risk.” 
22 In addition to restrictions on extending credit to institutions not certified as “viable” by a primary Federal 
regulator or by the Fed Chairman, the law provided that the Fed would incur a liability to the FDIC if it did lend and 
a subsequent failure imposed a cost on the deposit insurance fund.  
23 The FDIC would have to determine that the bank’s management was competent, had complied with applicable 
laws, and that there was no “insider abuse.” more than offset by the disaster in financial markets that would have occurred had Long-Term 
Capital Management been forced into sudden bankruptcy.
24 
 
IV. WHY AREN’T LARGE FINANCIAL COMPANIES PERMITTED TO FAIL?  
 
That banks are vulnerable to runs that could cause panics and economic distress was the basis for 
the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 and federal deposit insurance in the 1930s. The moral hazard 
issue made both controversial when first established.
25 Now generally accepted, this Federal 
safety net added a macro-prudential rationale for regulation and supervision.
26  
  Following the massive bank failures of the 1930s, regulatory restrictions on competition 
and risk-taking implied that all banks were too important to fail. In contrast, deregulation that got 
underway in the 1960s proceeded on the assumption that bank failure could be tolerated.  
  The largest banks have been an exception. The explicit justification by bank regulators 
(and Congress) for bailing out large financial firms has been to forestall systemic threats. Some 
have questioned this justification, suggesting that bank regulators have tended to exaggerate. For 
example, a post-bailout analysis of Continental Illinois found that closing the bank without the 
FDIC protections for uninsured creditors would not have resulted in the failure of many other 
banks.
27 
  The “exaggeration” charge is consistent with the observation that bank regulators have 
covered-up problems and have been sluggish in closing insolvent banks. It has been argued that 
they are motivated by personal gain in the form of career advancement and the retention of 
                                                           
24 Ex ante, the Greenspan decision standard might be stated as follows: the expected cost (weighted probability) of 
disaster was greater than expected benefits of reducing moral hazard. This might be true even if the probability of 
financial collapse was relatively low. See also GAO, Long-Term Capital Management, Report GAO/GGD-00-3, 
October (1999) and Lowenstein (2000: 194–195, 229 ff.).   
25 See Smith (1936). Even Bagehot, who argued the need for the Bank of England to serve as a lender of last resort, 
understood that doing so constituted a departure from free market principles and encouraged financial institutions to 
take on increased risk. For early criticism of Treasury intervention in panics, see Andrew (1907: 560). For early 
criticism of deposit insurance, see Laughlin (1908) and Roosevelt (1932). 
26 For a brief but careful discussion of the moral hazard created by the lender-of-last-resort safety net, see Bryant 
(1984: 22 ff).  
27 Stern and Feldman (2004: 48–49). influence.
28 If true, their behavior would constitute a type of malfeasance linked to complaints 
about the political influence of large financial institutions.  
  Exaggerated concerns about systemic risk, sluggishness in closing large failing banks, 
and seemingly unjustified bailouts can reflect yet another motive—that is, the belief that large 
financial companies serve a public interest. In Japan and other southeast Asian countries where 
large banks provide a mechanism for the allocation of resources, there is evidence that this 
motive is important.
29 Absent central planning or industrial policy, and during a period in which 
large financial firms have been severely criticized, this motive may not seem applicable in the 
United States. But there is a long historical record of public purposes served by large banks.  
  In the 1984 Hearings on Continental Illinois, Congressman Frank Annunzio articulated 
one kind of “public interest” defense for the bailout: 
 
“Too much attention has been given to the negative side of the bailout.., 
but not enough to the positive side.... [B]etween 10,000 and 12,000 
Continental employees would have lost their jobs, as well as the 
employees of the other banks who had large uninsured deposits in 
Continental.... I make no apology... for carrying water of those... 
employees and those thousands of small shareholders... widows and 
pensioners and... pension funds involving hundreds and thousands of 
workers that are on the books of the Continental Bank.”
30 
 
  In the same Hearings, Congressman Jim Leach asked the Comptroller of the Currency, C. 
T. Conover, if Continental could be liquidated at no cost to anyone, would there be “a loss to 
society?” Could one argue, he continued “on size grounds... to save something that is truly 
important, a national resource” (italics added).
31 Large banking companies have, in recent years, 
been defended on the grounds that they operate efficiently, not only to meet the global financial 
needs of their large corporate customers, but to help integrate world financial markets and 
promote economic growth in developing countries.
32  
                                                           
28 Edward Kane has been the principal proponent of this view. For an evaluation of the analysis, see Stern and 
Feldman (2004: 51 ff.). 
29 Stern and Feldman (2004: 56–58). 
30 Annunzio (1984: 80–81). 
31 Inquiry into Continental Illinois Corp. and Continental Illinois National Bank (1984: 373). The Comptroller 
replied: “No, we never thought Continental was important as a national resource.” It is not clear from the record 
whether Leach accepted this answer.  
32 For an elaboration of this view, see Calomiris (2009).   This “national resource” motivation for forbearance and bailouts merits further 
consideration. It has deep historic roots. Public service was a well understood obligation of the 
first banks chartered in the United States; they were modeled on the 17th–18th century Bank of 
England, “a private firm employed as a public agent.”
33 The bank-government relationship was 
on-going and involved various quid pro quos, including government support for banks in 
difficulty.  
  The Bank of England itself provided an early example of what this meant. After being 
chartered to extend credit to the government, as well as to operate as a private bank, it faced a 
run in 1696 and was forced to suspend cash payments, but it had the support of the Treasury. 
Charles Montagu, Chancellor of the Exchequer, wrote: “...the bank notwithstanding all the 
hardships... are yet resolved to venture all for the Government and I hope what they do in our 
distress will not be forgotten in theirs....” John Houblon, the first Governor of the Bank of 
England, told his shareholders that Lords of the Treasury had indicated that “...neither the 
Government nor the trade of England can be carried on without creditt, and that they know if the 
creditt of the Bank be not maintained, no other creditt can be supported.”
34 In only its second 
year of existence, the Bank of England was TBTF.  
  Similar stories can be related about early American banks. A hundred years after the 
Bank of England withstood a run, the Bank of New York found it could not pay its debt to the 
First Bank of the United States. At the request of Alexander Hamilton, Treasury Secretary Oliver 
Wolcott intervened to secure forbearance. Wolcott sensibly expressed a concern that still 
resonates. “These institutions have all been mismanaged; I look upon them with terror. They are 
at present the curse, and I fear they will prove the ruin of the Government.”
35 In 1796, the Bank 
of New York was also TBTF. 
  Perhaps the oldest recorded case that illuminated the “public purpose” motive for support 
involved the Jewish court bankers of the 10th century Abbasid Caliphate. The bankers were 
subject to intense pressure to provide funds to the government. It was surprising to scholars that 
                                                           
33 See Shull (1983). 
34 The description of events and quotations are from Clapham (1945: 39–50).   
35 Wolcott’s letter of December 8, 1796 is reprinted in Syrett (1974: 435–436). An earlier call for help to the 
Treasury by the Bank of New York, as a result of specie withdrawals, is reported in Hammond (1957: 84). Another 
early request for Treasury help by a Pennsylvania bank is described in Holdsworth (1910: 67–68). they survived as long as they did.
36 The explanation was found in an early 10th century 
document: 
 
The bankers “...were never dismissed..; to uphold the dignity of the 
office... so that the merchants might... lend through the... jahbadh 
[banker].... Were a jahbadh to be dismissed and another appointed... with 
whom the merchants had not yet had any dealings, the business of the 
Caliph would come to a standstill.”
37 
 
These bankers were also TBTF. 
  That this kind of symbiotic relationship between government and large banks is still 
relevant was evidenced in 1982, when Mexico was unable to service its debt and had begun to 
suffer a flight of capital. The crisis threatened the largest American banks, to which Mexico was 
indebted, and the stability of Mexico itself, as well as other Western Hemisphere countries. Paul 
Volcker, then Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, engineered a rescue.
38 He secured loans 
from national and international governmental agencies and persuaded the banks to exercise 
forbearance. When the crisis was resolved, he extolled the “community of interest among 
borrowers and lenders, among governments and private businesses...”
39  
  Shortly thereafter, Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan defended a request to 
Congress for an additional $8.5 billion to the International Monetary Fund that would help repay 
the debt of developing countries to large American banks. 
 
“There is a widespread concern that [this]... will amount to a bail-out of 
banks at the expense of American taxpayers. Many would contend... that 
they’ve dug themselves... into this hole through greed and 
incompetence.... Errors in judgment were made, and excesses on the part 
of both borrowers and lenders are now evident.... But we should not 
ignore the fact that the banks performed an invaluable function during 
the 1970s in taking primary responsibility for recycling the OPEC 
surpluses to deficit nations. Had the banks not performed this task, the 
strains on the international financial system would have been much 
greater and the amount of official financing from governments, including 
the United States, would have far exceeded the amounts now being 
sought.”
40  
                                                           
36 Fischel (1937: 23, 32–33).  
37 Nishwar al-Muhadara, in Fischel (1937: 28–29). 
38 For relevant details, see Kraft (1984). For a brief review and additional references, see Shull (2005: 149–152).  
39 As quoted in Kraft (1984: 49). 
40 Regan (1983: 17).    Secretary Regan was probably unaware that he was channeling the sentiments of Charles 
Montagu in 1696: “... I hope what they do in our distress will not be forgotten in theirs....”
41 
  It can be briefly noted that this motivation is consistent with other legislative and policy 
developments over the last quarter-of-a-century, including the systemic risk exception in 
FDICIA, the relaxed bank merger policy over the last 25 years that facilitated the growth of the 
largest banks, the merger of large failing banks into large floundering banks during the crisis of 
2007–09, and government bail outs of automobile, aircraft, and other nonbanking firms whose 
failure did not constitute a  systemic threat, but whose survival was deemed to have public value.  
 
VI. MOTIVES AND COUNTERMEASURES  
 
The effectiveness of specific measures to deal with the problems raised by TBTF policies 
depends on the motivation(s) for regulatory forbearance and bailouts. As noted, however, the 
several motives are not mutually exclusive and may all need to be addressed.  
  If the motivation is to forestall systemic threat, then measures that aim at the prevention 
of bank failure are in order. Reforms would include risk-constraining regulation and more 
rigorous supervision, possibly augmented by new approaches to “market discipline” and new 
techniques for quickly closing failed banks. These types of reforms have been debated over the 
years and have been the focus of legislation now under consideration in Congress.
42 How well 
they succeed remains to be seen.
43  
  If banking problems were only the product of inept, imprudent, or dishonest managers, 
then better supervision and regulation might be fully effective in eradicating failures. But 
experience and analysis indicates that the principal cause of banking problems have been macro-
                                                           
41 Paul Krugman (2009) recently commented on another aspect of the on-going bank-government relationship. With 
respect to the fate of Bear Sterns in the recent crisis, he observed that: “[m]ajor financial firms are a small club, with 
shared interest... Furthermore, big financial firms have a long-term relationship, both with the government and with 
each other, and can pay a price if they act selfishly in times of crisis. Bear Stearns... earned itself a lot of ill will by 
refusing to participate in that 1998 rescue [of Long-Term Capital Management], and it’s widely believed that this ill 
will played a major factor in the demise of Bear Sterns itself....” 
42 See Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010 and Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2009. Proposals for fortifying market discipline through additional disclosure and the issuance of subordinated 
debentures have been discussed for more than 15 years. See Stern and Feldman (2004: ch. 13, appx. D). 
43 For a discussion of additional issues that suggest current reform may not be effective, see Kregel (2009). economic processes that periodically turn good managers into bad ones.
44 Recurring shocks to 
the system and financial instability are to be expected, as is banks becoming fragile over long 
periods of prosperity.  
  If, in such circumstances, forbearance and bailouts derive from exaggerated claims of 
systemic threat, whether the product of honest miscalculation or private career interests, 
supervisory and regulatory reforms will prove ineffective. Measures that penalize the regulatory 
authorities for miscalculation or misdeeds, restrict discretion, and alter incentives would be in 
order.
45 
  Finally, if forbearance and bailouts reflect an implicit contract that accepts the largest 
financial companies as having a survival value in the public interest, then all of the above 
reforms would prove futile. The remedy would be structural; that is, to distribute the public 
interest among a larger group of banking firms than the handful in which there currently exists a 
disproportionate and growing concentration of financial resources, so that no one or few would 
be perceived as irreplaceable.  
  To this end, there have been recent proposals to break-up the largest companies. Well-
known financial authorities have argued that “if they’re too big to fail, they’re too big.”
46 
Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, has said that “[i]t is in our collective interest to 
reduce the dependence of so many households and businesses on so few institutions that engage 
in so many risky activities.”
47  
  There is precedent in the United States for judicious divestitures. Antitrust decisions 
dismembered nonfinancial companies such as Standard Oil in 1911, Alcoa in 1945, and AT&T 
in 1983. In 1933, the Glass-Steagall Act forced financial firms to choose between accepting 
deposits and dealing in securities. J.P. Morgan split into Morgan Guaranty and Morgan Stanley; 
First Boston Corporation separated from First National Bank of Boston. In some cases, affiliates 
surrendered their banking charters and liquidated their assets; in others they separated from 
parent banks and continued as independent firms.  
                                                           
44 See, for example, Minsky (1971, 1982). 
45 For some proposals in this respect, see Stern and Feldman (2004: 58–59 and appendix B). 
46 This group includes former Fed chairman, Alan Greenspan and former Secretary of the Treasury, George Schultz. 
See McKee and Lanman (2009). 
47 Wessel (2009: A2).   The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 also forced divestitures. Under its provisions, 
registered bank holding companies (those controlling two or more banks) were prohibited from 
controlling almost all nonbanking firms. Their permissible activities, narrowly interpreted by the 
Fed, were to be of a “financial, fiduciary, or insurance nature” that was “closely related to the 
business of banking....” Transamerica, which controlled a large number of commercial banks in 
western states as well as other affiliates engaged in activities such as insurance, real estate, fish 
packing, and oil development, made a decision to withdraw from banking. 
  One type of break-up suggested would restore Glass-Steagall Act restrictions that were 
eliminated by the Gramm-Leach-Blyley Act of 1999 (GLB).
48 To fully separate commercial 
banking from investment banking, and other kinds of financial and non-financial activities, 
additional restrictions would be necessary. Prior to the 1999 Act, commercial banks had been 
able to expand into investment banking, insurance, and other activities through interpretation of 
existing law by the Federal bank regulatory agencies.
49   
  The wisdom of restoring commercial banking to Glass-Steagall Act status has been 
disputed,
50 but it would be reasonable to restrict further growth by closing some of the avenues 
for activity expansion that GLB permits.
51 Early Fed and the Treasury proposals and rulings 
under GLB implied an interaction between the old standard for activity expansion (“closely 
related to banking”) and the new standard for financial holding companies (“financial in nature”) 
that implied a dynamic expansion of permissible activities into both financial and commercial 
activities, possibly to the point where conglomerates like Transamerica, before the 1956 Holding 
Company Act could be put together.  
                                                           
48 The Glass-Steagall sections of the Banking Act of 1933 were 16, 20, 21, and 32. Sec. 16 limited bank dealing and 
underwriting to specified types of securities: i.e., obligations of the United States and general obligations of states 
and political subdivisions. Sec. 20 prohibited banks from having affiliates principally engaged in dealing in 
securities. Sec. 21 prohibited firms dealing in securities from accepting deposits. Sec. 32 prohibited interlocks of 
directors and officers of securities firms and banks. The Gramm-Leach-Blyley Act repealed Sections 20 and 32.   
49 Beginning in the 1980s, the Fed interpreted the term “principally engaged” in Section 20 to permit holding 
company affiliates to underwrite otherwise impermissible securities. The OCC had permitted national banks to 
engage in otherwise impermissible activities, including insurance activities, through “special operating subsidiaries” 
if it was determined that they were “incidental” to “the business of banking.” Glass-Steagall Act restrictions did not 
apply to state-chartered non-Federal Reserve- member banks.. 
50 For reasons why it is impractical to restore the Glass-Steagall Act provisions separating commercial from 
investment banking, see Kregel (2010).  
51 For an analysis of the mechanisms for activity expansion under GLB, see Shull (2002).   The “Volcker rule” that would prohibit proprietary trading, as well as sponsoring of and 
investing in hedge funds and private equity funds is an example of selective activity prohibition. 
It is not directly aimed at size and concentration, but it could be viewed as contributing to 
restraints on increases in both. To that end, a careful review of activities made possible by GLB 
(e.g., real estate brokerage and management) to select an activity that has been controversial, 
might be undertaken to assess the benefits and costs, including the cost of augmenting the size of 
banks currently too big to fail. It is notable that GLB does not require a net public benefits test 
for entry into activities determined to be “financial in nature.” 
  Additional constraints on activity expansion may slow the growth of the largest 
companies somewhat. A revision of bank merger policy would slow growth further. As 
discussed in the appendix, bank merger policy, that for close to a half-century has incorporated 
antitrust standards, has ignored TBTF issues.
52 The policy should be revised to require the 
Federal bank regulatory agencies, when reviewing mergers, to consider the competitive and 
soundness issues raised by the harmful effects of TBTF. It should be possible, through a revision 
of bank merger policy, to prevent the further concentration of financial resources in a handful of 
companies and, over time, to reduce it. 
  Activity and merger restrictions will help, but not, in themselves, solve the problem. 
Further break-ups of large banking companies may be possible without adverse side effect on 
efficiency. As shown in the appendix, the largest have grown through mega-mergers over the 
past two decades. Any break up might begin with unwinding some of the more recent mergers 
that were approved without any consideration given to TBTF.    
  It is important to note that neither merger nor activity restrictions, nor even more radical 
break-ups of the existing large financial companies, need result in any significant loss in 
economic efficiency. After decades of research, a consensus has emerged among economists to 
the effect that economies of scale are exhausted at well below the size of the largest banks and 
economies of scope deriving from their diversification are difficult to find.
53   
 
                                                           
52 White (2009).  
53 For a recent review of the literature, see Scherer (2010). For an earlier review, see Shull and Hanweck (2001: 133–
135 and 151–155). Despite declarations of improved efficiency by banks proposing mergers, the evidence is, at best, 
mixed (Rhoades 1998).  VII. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The bailout of almost every major financial company in the United States in the course of the 
financial crisis of 2007–09, coupled with efforts to eliminate such bailouts over the last 40 years, 
has made clear that TBTF is an intractable problem. The moral hazard and competitive side 
effects of bailouts are unacceptable, yet when large banks are in dire straits they appear 
unavoidable. 
  The persistence of TBTF policies in the face of supervisory and regulatory reforms and 
the possible exaggeration of systemic threats, raise questions as to the motives of the authorities. 
A better understanding of the rationale(s) for TBTF policies throws light on why they have been 
so difficult to contain and the kind of reforms that might be effective.   
  In addition to the justification that forbearance and bailouts are necessary to forestall 
systemic threats, it has been argued that authorities pursue such policies for personal gain. Still 
another rationale may derive from a long-standing bank-government relationship that finds 
public value in the continued functioning of the largest financial firms. These several motives are 
not mutually exclusive, but they have differing implications for effective reform.  
  Current legislative proposals have focused on moderating systemic risk through 
modifications to supervision and regulation, and new approaches to resolving large bank failures.  
The emergence of a few very large companies in which financial resources are concentrated 
raises questions as to whether this approach alone will be effective. Limiting further growth 
through restrictions on specific activities, revisions of bank merger policy, and possibly 
divestiture to reduce concentration provides some hope for containing TBTF problems. 
Proposals to revise policy are suggested. 
  Whatever the motivation for forbearance and bailouts, it is risky to have a relatively few 
large banking institutions in which a large proportion of financial resources are concentrated. 
Each, by virtue of its absolute and relative size, would be system-threatening in failure, each 
would unavoidably exercise powerful influence over regulatory authorities, and each would 
likely be viewed as an irreplaceable “national resource.”  
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BANK MERGER POLICY  
 
Originally designed to restrain concentration and the rapid growth of large banks, bank merger 
policy has, over the last several decades, facilitated mergers and acquisitions by the largest 
banking companies and substantially increased concentration. Growing in absolute and relative 
size, a number have emerged as clearly posing a systemic threat. 
  Between 1980 and 2009, there were well over 10,000 mergers (table 1). The number of 
independent commercial banking organizations was cut in half, declining from about 12,000 to 
about 6,000 (table 2). 
  The most notable structural change has been the increase in national concentration. Over 
this period, the deposits held by the 5 largest commercial banking organizations in the United 
States increased from about 12 percent to 43 percent (table 3). The top five became the top four 
with the Wells Fargo acquisition of Wachovia in 2008.  
  Since 1991, the four largest grew substantially through large acquisitions of banks whose 
size reached into the many hundreds of billions. Over this period, the modern Bank of America, 
the largest banking company in the country today, materialized out of 18 such large mergers. The 
modern Wells Fargo was forged in 12, JP Morgan Chase in 7, and Citigroup in 3, including the 
massive combination of CitiCorp and Travelers (table 4). 
  Every merger and acquisition that contributed to this structural transformation was first 
reviewed and approved by a Federal bank regulatory agency (the Comptroller of the Currency, 
the Federal Reserve, or FDIC). Since the early 1960s, these agencies have evaluated the 
competitive effects of each proposal under the provisions of the Bank Merger and Holding 
Company Acts. Competitive review typically focuses on the projected impact in one or more 
local markets and is based on current antitrust standards. The Justice Department provides the 
banking agencies with an advisory memorandum in each case; it retains jurisdiction over bank 
mergers under the antitrust laws.  
  Even before competitive issues came within the domain of the banking agencies, they had 
the responsibility to consider the effects of bank mergers on “the convenience and needs of the 
community,” the “financial condition” of the banks, and “prospects”—the so-called “banking factors.” None of the federal banking agencies have ever considered the too-big-to-fail issue in 
any merger evaluations. 
  Large banks have typically merged through holding companies. The Federal Reserve has 
primary authority over holding company combinations. While its evaluations of both holding 
company and bank mergers resulted in a number of important denials in the 1960s and the early 
1970s, since the mid-1980s, there have been few denials and none of large bank combinations.
1   
 
There have been several reasons for these developments: 
 
(1) Changes in the banking environment. Liberalization of branching and activity restrictions 
permitted geographic- and product-market expansion, thereby enabling freer entry and more 
potential competition. 
 
(2) Improved analytical techniques. A revision of the Justice Department’s “Merger Guidelines” 
provided a better basis for bank market determination that tended to expand markets and thereby 
reduce concentration levels. 
 
(3) Changes in the Federal Reserve’s approach to merger review. Most importantly, the Federal 
Reserve established a new approach in the 1980s that effectively made possible the approval of 
all large bank mergers. It provisionally accepted Justice Department’s “Guidelines” as to the 
impact of a proposed merger on local market concentration. If the Guideline levels were violated 
by the proposed merger, the Board would negotiate concentration-reducing divestitures. If these 
did not fully correct the problem, it would consider “mitigating factors” as offsets. These 
mitigating factors included:  
 
 
                                                           
1 The rare denial on competitive grounds by the Federal Reserve has typically been a small bank combination in a 
rural market. The last one was BancSecurity Corp of Mashalltown, IA ($415 million deposits) to acquire 
Marshalltown Financial Corp. ($103 million in deposits) in 1996. The geographic market was determined to be rural 
Marshall County plus a few other adjacent areas. The merger would have caused the Herfindalh-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) to increase 849 points to 3032, well in excess of the Justice Department’s acceptable standards. The Justice 
Department has not been in court with a bank merger case since 1987. Its last suit was in the mid-1980s. The last 
court decision was in1987 (U. S. v Central State Bank, 621 F. Supp. 1276).  (a) the continued presence of potential competitors;  
    (b) the existence of a substantial number of banks remaining in the market; and 
    (c) improvements in efficiency.       
     
  The elimination of interstate branching restrictions by the Riegle-Neal Act after 1994 
expanded the pool of potential competitors in most metropolitan area markets. The continued 
operations of small banks in the market was similarly viewed as an offset to higher 
concentration, even when they constituted a “fringe” group in a market dominated by one or two 
major banking firms. The extent to which claims of improvements in efficiency were accepted is 
difficult to determine. As noted above, a general consensus had developed after decades of 
research that economies of scale were exhausted at bank sizes well below that of the largest 
banks and there was little evidence of economies of scope. In a unique study by Rhoades of post-
merger changes in efficiency in nine cases, he found, at best, mixed evidence of gains.
2 The 
mergers selected for study were ones that were most likely, a priori, to improve efficiency. All 
resulted in significant cost cutting, but only four resulted in actual cost efficiency gains. No 
identifiable factors could be cited as causing improved efficiency gains, not even condition 
whereby one of the merging banks was clearly more efficient than the other.   
     The new approach permitted the Federal Reserve largely to offset effects on local 
market concentration in approving mergers. In 1997, it approved a merger of the largest bank in 
Columbus, OH, with about 61 percent of market deposits, to acquire the second largest bank in 
the market with about 19 percent. It did require divestitures that notably restrained the increase in 
the leading bank’s market share to about 64 percent.
3 The approval, nevertheless, increased bank 
concentration in a local market that was more than double the level that the Justice Department 
viewed as “highly concentrated.” Approvals such as this, and others,
4 raised questions as to 
whether the Federal Reserve, which in earlier years had been the most aggressive Federal agency 
in constraining bank mergers, would ever deny another one. In fact, since 1996, it has not.
5 
                                                           
2 Rhoades (1992) 
3 Southern National Corporation, 83 Fed. Res. Bull., 596, 598 and Dissent, 602 (1997).  
4 The Board’s approval of the merger of NationsBank Corp and Barnett Banks, Inc. in 1997 raised similar questions 
in several Florida markets. See NationsBank Corp 84 Fed. Res. Bull. 130-35 (1998).   
5 Some Board members and the Board’s staff have, nevertheless, suggested that a number of proposed mergers have 
been discouraged in informal discussions prior to the submission of applications.   Throughout their thousands of merger reviews, as mentioned, neither the Federal 
Reserve, nor any other Federal banking agency, nor, for that matter, the Justice Department, has 
ever considered the anticompetitive implications of establishing or augmenting a banking 
organization too big to fail. Nor have they ever considered the systemic threat possibilities as a 
“banking factor.”    
  At least one revision in merger and related policies was proposed about a decade ago, 
aimed at constraining large banking firms likely to be too big to fail.
6 The proposals remain 
relevant and should be an element in any program that aims to keep the TBTF problem from 
getting worse. They include:    
 
(1) A more complete analysis of each merger proposal by the Federal Reserve and other 
banking agencies. Mitigating factors have facilitated large bank mergers with adverse 
consequences. The addition of aggravating factors would serve as a counterweight. These should 
include:  
  Establishment or augmentation of a bank TBTF and related considerations, such as: (a) 
the effect of the merger on market dominance by merged organization; (b) evidence of reduced 
competitive effectiveness of the banks remaining in the market; and (c) the impact of the merger 
on the likelihood of intermarket coordination between the merged banks and other large banks. 
 
(2) Amend the Riegle-Neal Act. This 1994 Act now prohibits mergers where the resulting bank 
will have 10 percent or more of national deposits or 30 percent or more of a state’s deposits. 
These limits should provide for progressively increasing negative weights in merger cases as 10 
percent and 30 percent limits are approached. If aggregate concentration has anticompetitive 
and/or other adverse effects they are likely to develop incrementally, not suddenly above a 
specific limit—one that, in any event, can be avoided through the shifting of deposits. 
 
(3) Restrict negotiated divestitures. Bar divestiture agreements where one or both of the merging 
banks is already “too big to fail” or will become so as result of merger. Divestiture agreements 
have, by reducing projected local market concentration, enabled large bank mergers that have 
                                                           
6 These proposals, in more detail, can be found in Shull and Hanweck (2001: ch. 6). created and augmented such banks, thus sacrificing the anticompetitive and systemic risk 
consequences of too big to fail on the altar of local market concentration.   
 
(4) Impose higher capital requirements and deposit insurance premiums on large banks. On 
determination by a federal banking agency that the insolvency of a banking organization is likely 
to present as systemic threat, its capital requirements and deposit insurance premiums should be 
raised to approximate the costs to other banking firms not similarly supported. The aim is to 
moderate advantages and perverse incentives that flow from the likelihood of government 
support that reduces funding costs, expands borrowing capacity, creates incentive for greater risk 
taking, encourages additional mergers, and promotes anticompetitive behavior.  
 
(5) Require annual reports to congress on banking and financial structure. The federal 
banking agencies and the Justice Department should provide annual reports to Congress, with 
public hearings, on banking structure and competition, comparable to the monetary reports now 
provided by the Federal Reserve. Reports should include: merger policy developments, changes 
in banking and financial structure, evaluation of competitive issues created by developments, 
current practices and policies, and expectations for coming year.  
  The need for continuing congressional oversight of developing banking structure as 
managed by federal banking agencies and Justice Department in their merger decisions became 
apparent in the crisis of 2007–09. The TBTF problem is structural and ongoing in periods of 
prosperity, as well as in periods of financial crisis. The competitive and bail-out issues are two 














 APPENDIX B: TABLES 
  
 
Table 1. Numbers of Mergers, 1980-2009 
  
Bank MergersYY....10,787 





Notes: Mergers include combinations of thrift institutions with commercial banks 
Large Mergers@ are defined as mergers in which organization had $1 billion or more in assets.  
AMega-bank-mergers@ defined as mergers in which each organization had $10 billion or more in assets. 
 
 
Source: Adapted from data in Stephen A. Rhoades (1995) “Bank Mergers and Industry-wide Structure, 1980–94.” 
Staff Study, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Updated and revised data have been obtained from 






























       1980     2006   2009  
Structural Characteristic    
 
No. of insured US commercial banks          14,407     7,321   6,770 
No. of banking organizations             12,342     6,228   5,944 








Source: Adapted from data in Stephen A. Rhoades (2005) “Bank Mergers and Industry-wide Structure, 1980–94” 
Staff Study, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Updated and revised data have been obtained from 
































           (Percent of Deposits) 
 
Concentration      1980   2006   2009 
 
Held  by  top  5       11.9   35.9   42.5   
Held by top 10             18.6       45.1    52.0   
Held by top 25               29.1     60.0    65.6 





Source: Adapted from data in Stephen A. Rhoades (2005) “Bank Mergers and Industry-wide Structure, 1980–94” 
Staff Study, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.Updated and revised data have been obtained from 
the Financial Structure Section Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.  Concentration data is 
consolidated for banking organizations, i.e., all holding company bank subsidiaries, and relates to consolidated bank 





























Table 4. Merger Lineage of the Four Largest Domestic Banking Organizations* (principal mergers, 1991–
2008**, in billions of dollars) 
 
Banking Organization         Total Assets (12/31/2009)     Acquisitions (Assets)   
 
Bank of America Corp.         $2,252.814           1991: Nations Bank a. C&S/Sovereign ($51.4) 
1991: Fleet Financial Group a. Bank of New England ($13.4) 
1992: Bank America a. Security Pacific ($76.4) 
1993: Nations Bank a. MNC ($17.0) 
1994: Bank America a. Continental ($22.6) 
1995: Fleet Financial a. Shawmut ($32.7) 
1996: Fleet Financial a. National Westminster ($430.1) 
1996: Bank of Boston a. Bay Banks ($12.1)  
                     1997: Nations Bank a. Barnett ($44.7) 
                     1997: Nations Bank a. Boatmen’s ($41.8) 
1998: Nations Bank a. Bank America ($265) (Bank of America) 
1999: Fleet Boston a. Bank Boston Corp ($50.7) 
2002: Fleet Boston a. Summit Bancorp ($39.9)  
2004: Bank of American a. Fleet Boston ($203.2) 
2007: Bank of America a. LaSalle Bank Corp ($115.7) 
2007: Bank of America a. U.S. Trust Corp ($10.5) 
2008: Bank of America a. Countrywide Financial Corp. ($121.4) 
2008: Bank of America a. Merrill Lynch ($875.0) 
 
JPMorgan Chase Co.         $2,041.009                       1991: Chase Manhattan a. Manufacturers Hanover ($38.4)    
1993: Bank One a. Valley National ($11.5) 
1996: Chemical a. Chase Manhattan ($121) 
2000: Chase Man. a. Morgan & Co. ($73.8) (JPMorgan Chase) 
2004: JPMorgan Chase a. Bank One ($328.8) 
2008: JPMorgan Chase a. Washington Mutual Inc. ($353.1) 
2008: JPMorgan Chase a. Bear Sterns ($350e) 
 
CitiGroup         $1,888.599          1998: Travelers ($420.0) a. Citicorp ($331) (CitiGroup) 
2001: CitiGroup a. European American ($15.0) 
2002: CitiGroup a. Golden State Bancorp ($50.7) 
 
Wells Fargo & Co.          $1,228.652           1991: First Union a. Southeast ($13,390) 
1995: First Union a. First Fidelity ($35.7) 
1996: Core States a. Meridian ($15.3) 
1996: Wells Fargo a. First Interstate ($58.1) 
1998: Norwest a. Wells Fargo ($93.2) (Wells Fargo)  
1998: First Union a. Core States ($46.9) 
2000: Wells Fargo a. First Security Corp ($21.4) 
2001: First Union a. Wachovia ($70.6) (Wachovia) 
2004: Wachovia a. South Trust ($53.7) 
2006: Wachovia a. Golden West Financial Corp. ($144.5) 
2006: Wachovia a. Westcorp ($15.9) 
2008: Wells Fargo a. Wachovia Corp ($772.6) 
 
*In 1991, the largest 5 Domestic Banking Organizations in the United States held 16 percent of commercial banking assets in US. In 2009 
they held close to 42.5 percent. In 2008, the “Big 5” became the “Big 4” when Wells Fargo acquired Wachovia. The 5th largest bank holding 
company is now Goldman Sachs ($882,586.0) followed by Morgan Stanley and Met Life.  
** All Acquisitions are of organizations with $10 billion or more in assets.   
Source: Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System (Financial Structure Section). See also Stephen Pilloff, Bank Merger Activity in the 
United States, 1994–2003, Staff Study No. 176, May 2004, p. 9, Table 7. Total assets for 12/31/09 from FFIEC, National Information Center, 
“Total Assets of Top 50 Bank Holding Companies.” 
 